Financial regulatory networks are a pervasive, new type of global governance heralded by some as a flexible answer to globalization dilemmas and dismissed by others as ineffective due to weak enforcement mechanisms. Whether regulatory network agreements provide global public goods or private goods for certain states' firms is a second debated issue. This paper adjudicates among competing perspectives by examining whether Basel III, an international agreement negotiated by the bank regulatory network about bank capital minimums in 2009 and 2010, was viewed as credible and affecting regulated US firms. I use stock returns to measure investors' perceptions, and an event study methodology to test whether regulated banks' observed stock returns significantly differ from expected stock returns on days when new information about Basel III becomes available. If the agreement is viewed as credible and affecting firm value, banks' stock returns will deviate from expectations. The direction of any deviation indicates whether regulations benefit or hurt banks. While the direction of effects is not uniform across events, I find that the initial stock return reaction and the net effect across all five events are negative, indicating that US banks were not helped by new international regulations. Further, US banks experienced stock returns that differed from expectations, providing evidence that international regulatory network agreements are viewed as credible and tangibly affect firms independent of domestic implementation. * Author is a Ph.D. candidate in the Department of Politics, Princeton University (email: mwilf@princeton.edu, website: meredithwilf.webs.com). Many thanks to Christina Davis and Kosuke Imai for numerous iterations of comments, to Helen Milner for comments on earlier drafts and for the suggestion to look at the winners and losers of Basel III, and to Marc Ratkovic for assistance learning Lasso and for comments. For helpful comments and suggestions, thanks to
Introduction
Financial regulatory networks -international groups of national regulators -represent a new form of governance and are the primary fora for financial regulatory cooperation.
1 Comprised of national regulators, these are neither traditional intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) nor nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). Regulatory networks create international agreements, standards, best practices, and memoranda of understandings (MOUs) that are nonbinding upon members and rely upon decentralized implementation by national regulatory authorities. This paper's empirical analysis pushes forward two open debates about financial regulatory networks.
First, do investors view regulatory network agreements as credible? That is, are international agreements expected to be implemented domestically? Regulatory network agreements are nonbinding and lack enforcement mechanisms, which may limit implementation likelihood and the ability to identify and punish free riders. 2 Second, do these regulatory agreements help or hurt banks? Some scholars suggest these agreements create global public goods, while others argue they provide private benefits to regulated US firms.
3
To adjudicate among the competing claims of each debate, this paper analyzes the Basel III capital adequacy agreement negotiated by the bank regulatory network, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS). Basel III, negotiated between September 2009 and December 2010, is a most-likely agreement to affect firms because the agreement is detailed, which allows investors to evaluate expected distributional effects, and because prior agreements on the same topic have been in place since 1988, increasing the credibility of domestic implementation. Basel III unambiguously increased regulatory stringency compared to the status quo, both qualitatively (by narrowing the definition of capital) and quantitatively (by raising minimum required levels). If Basel III has no observable effect, then other BCBS outputs, such as principles and best practices, are unlikely to have any effect either.
Whether Basel III is credible and whether it holds distributional effects, however, is a priori ambiguous. If US banks incur adjustment costs and higher ongoing costs to comply with more stringent regu-1 See Slaughter 2004; Kahler and Lake 2009; and Helleiner 2012. 2 See Downs, Rocke, and Barsoom 1996; Fearon 1998; and Koremenos, Lipson, and Snidal 2001 . Specific to regulatory networks, see Slaughter 1997 and 2004; Verdier 2009; and Brummer 2011. 3 On the former, Kapstein 1989 and 1994 . On the latter, see Kapstein 1991; Oatley and Nabors 1998; Drezner 2007; and Simmons 2001. lations, they should be hurt. However, because regulated European and Japanese banks were expected to incur even higher adjustment costs than US banks, regulations may confer a competitive advantage upon, and potentially benefit, US banks. Regarding credibility, the US delayed implementation of Basel III's predecessor agreement, Basel II, in 2006 and while Europe implemented in a timely manner.
The effect of this compliance breach might decrease credibility of Basel III implementation within the US.
This paper uses an event study research design that incorporates stock returns as outcome measures to isolate investor perceptions about international regulatory network announcements.
4 Event studies analyze whether specific types of news (each instance of a news release constituting an "event") systematically affect outcomes of interest. Within the context of Basel III, events are BCBS press releases announcing Basel III negotiation progress. Basel III negotiations occur in secret and outcomes are announced through formal BCBS press releases. Thus, each press release provides new public information about Basel III regulations. On press release days, regulated firms' observed stock returns are compared to expected stock returns. If investors believe the agreement will be implemented domestically (i.e. the agreement is credible) and that domestic implementation will significantly affect regulated firm value (i.e. the agreement has distributional effects), then there should be a statistically significant difference between expected and observed stock returns. On the other hand, if regulatory network outcomes are viewed by investors as either incredible or lacking distributional effects, then there should be no observable difference. The direction of any effect indicates whether investors perceive regulations to help (if observed stock returns are systematically higher than expected) or hurt (if observed stock returns are systematically lower than expected) regulated firms.
Expected stock returns refer to stock returns that are expected in the absence of an announcement.
As they are unobserved counterfactuals, these values must be estimated from observed data. For each regulated firm for each event, this paper identifies a subset of firms that have similar stock return patterns to each regulated firm but that should be unaffected by the Basel III announcements. The full set of unaffected firms is comprised of 2,884 nonfinancial firms publicly traded on US stock exchanges. I use a variable selection method called a Lasso estimator to identify the subset of nonfinancial firms that best predicts each regulated firm's stock returns prior to the announcement. Then, on an announcement day, the observed stock returns of the unaffected firms are used to estimate the regulated firm's expected stock return.
The proposed approach used in this paper -using select, unaffected firms to estimate the counterfactual -improves upon the common event study approach. The traditional approach uses an aggregate market index (such as the S&P 500) as a single regressor to predict each regulated firm's stock returns, resulting in two major problems. First, an aggregate market index value may include the regulated firm itself, or other firms that are affected by the event of interest. In turn, there may be direct relationships between the regressor and dependent variable. The proposed approach ensures that only nonfinancial firms comprise the counterfactual. Second, an aggregate market index is an average of many firms' stock returns on a given day, and thus include many firms that do not predict the individual firm's stock returns well. For this reason, the single index predicts many individual firms' stock returns with a high degree of variation. In contrast, this paper uses a statistical method to identify unregulated firms whose stock returns are most correlated with each regulated firm's stock returns, creating a custom market index that fits historical data with a consistently high goodness of fit. I show that the Lasso regression explains more variation in historical stock return data and provides more precise predicted values on event days compared to the traditional approach.
Stock return patterns across the five BCBS announcements about Basel III negotiating progress provide evidence that Basel III was viewed as credible and as having real effects upon regulated firms.
On each announcement day, regulated firms' stock returns systematically differed from expectations.
The direction of the effects is not uniform across events, but the initial reaction and net effect across all five events are negative. Early events (the two 2009 announcements) are associated with US bank stock returns that are systematically lower than expected by an average of 1.43% and 0.41%, respectively, representing billions of dollars in foregone equity value. On these days, investors either sold bank stocks, or did not buy as readily as expected. Negative reactions to the unexpected initial announcement in 
Credibility and Distributional Effects
Two debates surround the credibility and distributional effects of financial regulatory networks. First, increased regulatory stringency could plausibly help or hurt regulated firms. Second, it is unclear whether international financial regulatory network agreements will be credibly implemented as national regulations in the first place.
To adjudicate among the conflicting expectations of each debate, this paper uses systematic empirical analysis applied to Basel III. Basel III is an international agreement negotiated in 2009 and 2010 that codified bank capital minimums. Basel III emerged from closed negotiations among BCBS members.
Negotiation outcomes are publicly reported through official press releases. Because of the surprise timing and content of press releases, firm-level stock returns are used to isolate and measure financial regulatory effects as perceived by investors, and as distinct from other regulations negotiated at similar times such as the US Dodd-Frank Act. Whether observed stock returns deviate from expected stock returns on days of press releases, and the direction of any deviation, informs the two debates. Hypotheses that tie theoretical expectations to observable stock return outcomes are discussed before turning to research design and empirical analysis in the subsequent section.
Theoretical Debates About Regulatory Networks
What is the motivation behind increased regulatory stringency through financial regulatory networks?
And, are resulting international agreements viewed as credible? The 1988 agreement (called Basel I)
that first codified bank capital minimums is alternatively characterized as global public goods provision and as providing private goods for US domestic banks. 5 Both perspectives assume the agreement will be credibly implemented across BCBS member countries, but they hold different expectations about the direction of the agreement's distributional effects for regulated firms.
The public goods perspective is that international agreements enable greater financial stability while maintaining competitive advantage across countries. 6 Regulators desire both financial stability and domestic bank competitiveness, yet when a regulator unilaterally decides upon a level of national regulatory stringency, he faces a tradeoff between these two objectives, known as the "regulator's dilemma". 7 Higher (lower) regulatory stringency increases (decreases) financial stability, but hinders (helps) competitiveness of regulated firms. However, if regulators from different countries coordinate regulatory increases, it alleviates each country's regulator's dilemma. Financial stability increases while competitiveness is maintained. The increase in financial stability is a global public good.
A contrasting, private goods perspective is that higher regulatory stringency increases the competitiveness of firms in states that already have high regulatory stringency. 8 International agreements require member countries with low regulatory stringency to increase minimum regulatory levels, while member countries with higher regulatory stringency, at the time of the agreement, face lower adjustment costs to comply. In this way, banks in states with high regulatory stringency prior to the agreement will incur private gains in competitiveness compared to banks in states with relatively low status quo stringency.
9
These perspectives anticipate opposite distributional effects. The public goods perspective expects Oatley and Nabors 1998. 9 Within the context of Basel I, Japanese bank expansion was the main concern. See, for example, Oatley and Nabors 1998, 36; and Tarullo 2008, 45-54. competitive advantage across countries is maintained while all countries' banks must comply with higher minimums. In this case, US banks will be hurt by increased regulatory stringency, as compliance requires adjustment and ongoing operational costs. The private goods perspective expects relative benefits for banks in countries with high regulatory stringency prior to the agreement. In this case, US banks, which begin from high stringency, will benefit from competitive advantages shaped by the agreement.
The credibility of financial regulatory networks, while assumed by both the public goods and the private goods perspectives, is debated among international law scholars. Regulatory networks represent a new form of governance that does not neatly fit into existing governance typologies.
10 From a functionalist perspective, the rise and proliferation of regulatory networks implies that demand exists for such governance structures. Slaughter argues that these groups are flexible, efficient, and accountable, and that their nonbinding nature facilitates governments' willingness to delegate to international bodies.
11
From an institutional design perspective, Verdier and Brummer, among others, argue that regulatory network agreements are ineffective because they lack enforcement mechanisms.
12
Negotiated agreements that emerge from financial regulatory networks are all nonbinding soft law, as they are not established through treaties or other formal obligations among countries. Kahler and Lake, eds. 2003; Hawkins, Lake, Nielson, and Tierney, eds., 2006; and Buthe and Mattli 2011 . This list excludes a large legal scholarship exploring concepts and implications of hard versus soft international law.
11 Slaughter 1997 , 185-186 and 2004 , 1-64. 12 Verdier 2009 and Brummer 2011, especially 263-264. 13 Soft law describes agreements that are legally nonbinding, while hard law includes laws or regulations on the books. See, for example, Abbott and Snidal 2000; and Raustiala 2005 . In the US case, regulators hold administrative authority to implement into regulations.
14 Lipson and Simmons both argue that nonbinding, or informal agreements rely upon reputation to compel compliance. Lipson 1991; and Simmons 2000. 15 This statement is descriptive and takes the regime design as a given in order to emphasize the questionable nature of country compliance with financial regulatory network agreements. Theoretically, institutional design features are endogenous to member preferences at creation and evolution of any regime. Explaining the design of financial regulatory regimes lies outside the scope of this paper, although existing theories expect that states create weak institutions when there is a ically, the BCBS relies upon decentralized implementation, holds limited monitoring channels, and has no process to address compliance breaches, all increasing state discretion to implement and comply on an ongoing basis. In contrast to "unexpected loss", an example of an "expected loss" is a bank's estimated percentage of loans that will not be repaid as part of standard business operations. Expected loss is incorporated directly into a reserve line item on the bank's balance sheet. 23 The following is a simplified description for the purpose of explaining the role of capital and how regulatory definition of capital may affect firms' costs in the short-and medium-term. For a more technical review, see Tarullo 2008, 16-29. 24 Because of double-entry bookkeeping, at any given time a company's assets exactly equal the sum of a company's liabilities plus shareholder's equity.
comprised of shareholder's equity accounts, and in this way it acts as a buffer against insolvency (i.e. paying debt obligations) in the case that assets do not produce expected revenues to cover liabilities. The most narrow definition of "capital" would be common stock and retained company earnings. Broader definitions of capital reflect capital with higher levels of obligation for the company to pay shareholders (e.g. preferred stock and hybrid capital). Basel I and Basel II each defined two tiers of capital: "Tier 1" comprised of narrow capital and "Tier 2" comprised of broad capital. Basel III created additional minimum levels of common stock distinct from Tier 1 and Tier 2. 27 See footnote 22.
these assets. In contrast, investments considered more vulnerable, such as loans to non-OECD member governments, held a 100 percent risk-weighting, meaning minimum capital (8%) of the full value of the assets must be held by the bank.
28
Capital Ratio Levels. Basel III clearly increased minimum levels of required capital compared to Basel I and Basel II. 29 Minimum required levels of capital are associated with opportunity costs, as banks are forced to hold greater amounts of capital that could otherwise be invested to earn a return. 30 Firms that must raise capital to become compliant with new minimums will incur adjustment costs. For a bank to increase its capital ratio it must increase capital (the ratio's numerator) or decrease risk-weighted assets (the ratio's denominator). Common approaches by banks to increase capital ratio levels are to issue new stocks, to change the asset mix, or to sell-off assets. Each option is expensive, as new equity issues dilute existing stock shares' values, and selling assets or substantially changing asset mix takes time.
Implementation Timelines. Finally, implementation timelines affect banks' adjustment costs. BCBS members made clear throughout BCBS press releases that implementation would not hinder general economic recovery. Banks prefer long timelines because it allows for gradual compliance and the possibility of favorably interfering in regulatory details at the level of national implementation.
In summary, while Basel III unambiguously increased regulatory stringency compared to existing regulations, US firms could plausibly be helped or hurt. 31 Capital definitions were expected to affect European and Japanese regulated banks more so than US firms. The next section explains how stock returns are used to assess credibility and distributional outcomes of the regulations upon regulated US banks.
28 For in-depth discussion of the distortions and distributional effects of Basel Accord asset risk-weightings for developing countries, see Claessens, Underhill and Zhang 2008. 29 Basel I required 8% minimum capital to risk-weighted assets, with at least 4% of risk-weighted assets held as Tier 1 capital. Basel III also required 8% minimum capital to risk-weighted assets, but comprised of higher quality capital. Moreover, Basel III requires that common equity comprise at least 4.5% of risk-weighted assets and total Tier 1 capital (including common equity) must comprise at least of 6% of risk-weighted assets. Basel III additionally requires a dynamic, countercyclical buffer (additional capital that has to be held during times of high credit growth), a leverage ratio (a straightforward measure of Tier 1 capital over non-risk weighted assets), and a liquidity ratio (a measure of liquid assets as a percent of liabilities). GAO 2012, 8. 30 This is a common assumption but not a fact. For a strong argument that holding higher levels of capital does not increase firm costs, see Admati and Hellwig 2013. Additionally, many banks overcomply with capital regulations on an ongoing basis and therefore perhaps adjustment costs are small. See, for example, Winecoff 2012.
31 At any given time, however, the direction of the effect is contingent upon investors' expectations, which change as regulatory details develop.
Using Stock Returns to Measure Institutional Effects
It is challenging to find a measure that isolates the effects of international institutions and international agreements because international institutions are endogenous to member selection into institutions, and international agreements are endogenous to member negotiations. 
Surprise Announcements
BCBS press releases represent new public information about Basel III negotiation progress, making
Basel III an appropriate case upon which to apply an event study research design. Because stock returns constantly adjust to new information, to identify a stock price effect it is important that information be released to the public on a clear date without prior information leaks. 38 The standard BCBS negotiation process, followed for Basel III, upholds this element of surprise.
To negotiate Basel III, the BCBS followed its standard negotiation process characterized by closed meetings among BCBS members followed by public press releases to announce meeting outcomes, and a public consultative process. Table 1 outlines the five events that constitute the international agreement negotiations.
39
BCBS press releases are surprises in both release dates and content. As shown in Table 1 The forward of a new BCBS history specifically acknowledges that the historian's access to BCBS archives was granted under special permission. Even then not all archives were made available and access was restricted to the period ending in 1997. Nout Wellink in Goodhart 2011, ix-x. 42 This statement is a generalization of all Financial Times and The Wall Street Journal newspaper coverage surrounding the events. One exception is a leak on the Japanese market just prior to Event 5. 43 Young forthcoming. 44 The described process lies in contrast to G-20 leaders' meetings, the content of which is largely prearranged prior to meetings. Throughout Basel III negotiations, BCBS membership included 27 countries.
period, gives no impression that BCBS meeting outcomes were determined prior to each meeting. 
Contingent Expectations
Because stock return deviations capture changes relative to investor expectations at a given time, ideally each press release's content could be compared to an objective measure of investors' expectations just prior to the announcement on each dimension of regulations (e.g. expected capital levels, capital definitions, and implementation timeline). Unfortunately, no such measure exists to the author's knowledge and would be nearly impossible to create given limited media coverage of Basel III prior to announcements. However, media coverage provides high-level insights. Specifically, between September 2009 and December 2010, Basel III regulations were consistently expected to be more stringent than the status quo, and Event 1 (initial announcement that Basel III negotiations would begin) and Event 4 ("calibration", or the revelation of specific capital minimums and implementation timelines) emerge as the events that generated the most media coverage and may be considered most substantively important. 
Hypotheses
For reasons explained above, stock returns of US regulated banks on dates of BCBS press releases are used to proxy for investor reactions to Basel III negotiating progress. Each regulated firm's observed stock return is compared to a firm-specific counterfactual stock return. The counterfactual stock return is the estimated firm stock return in the absence of any extraordinary news on a given day. The difference between each firm's observed stock return and counterfactual stock return is the firm's abnormal return, or the estimated effect of the announcement for the firm ("Abnormal Firm Return"). The average effect across all firms on a trading day is the average effect of the press release ("Average Announcement Effect").
56 Average Announcement Effect is estimated for each of the five BCBS press release announcements between September 2009 and December 2010. If regulated firms experience systematically negative or positive average effects on days of BCBS announcements, this is evidence that investors are reacting to BCBS press release content.
As discussed earlier, the most fundamental question is whether BCBS press releases provide meaningful news to investors. Investors will only react to BCBS press releases if Basel III is viewed as both likely to be implemented and is viewed to significantly change perceived firm value. Thus, an Average Announcement Effect statistically distinct from zero requires an agreement that investors perceive as both credible and as having distributional effects. This leads to Hypothesis 1.
Hypothesis 1, Institutional Effect:
If an international agreement is viewed to be credible and to impact the profits of regulated firms, then regulated firms' stock returns will have non-zero Average Announcement Effects on press release days.
As discussed above, the direction of any effect implies whether US regulated banks were helped or hurt by Basel III regulations, and it is worth reiterating that stock price changes are conditional upon investor expectations at an existing point in time. Four mechanisms could underlie increasingly stringent regulations in a way that benefits banks. First, consistent with Oatley and Nabors, regulatory details may benefit firms that easily comply with regulations compared to firms that face high adjustment 56 In formal event study terminology, Average Announcement Effect is called "Average Abnormal Return". BCBS "announcements" and "press releases" are used interchangeably. For 58 Under all these alternative circumstances, US banks will benefit from stringent regulations, and stock returns would be systematically positive on event days.
If any of the four mechanisms are the dominant one at work, then US banks will benefit from stringent regulations. Demand for bank stocks will increase, regulated banks will have positive Abnormal Firm Returns, and in aggregate, Average Announcement Effect will be positive. This leads to Hypothesis 2a.
Hypothesis 2a, Bank Regulatory Benefits:
If Basel III is viewed as a credible international agreement and is expected to benefit regulated firms, then days of BCBS press releases will be associated with positive estimated Average Announcement Effects.
An alternative expectation is that Basel III will hurt banks due to compliance costs or because regulations are more stringent than expected. More stringent regulations are often associated with adjustment costs to become compliant and ongoing opportunity costs associated with holding higher capital. Increased firm costs will hurt banks. investments today compared to yesterday, demand for bank stocks will decrease, firms will experience negative Abnormal Firm Returns, and the analysis will reveal a negative Average Announcement Effect.
This leads to Hypothesis 2b.
Hypothesis 2b, Costly Bank Regulations: If Basel III is viewed as a credible international agreement
and is expected to increase regulated firms' operating costs, then days of BCBS press releases will be associated with negative estimated Average Announcement Effects.
For clarity, the three hypotheses are summarized in Table 2 . The next section formally defines the method used to test for evidence of each hypothesis, and the research design as applied to Basel III negotiations.
Empirical Analysis
This section applies an event study methodology to estimate the effect of Basel III negotiation news upon US regulated firm stock returns. After describing the event study methodology, sample firms, and events, I define the model and quantity of interest. The paper uses a variable selection method to estimate counterfactual outcomes (that is, stock returns in the absence of an announcement). Compared to the traditional approach, based upon an aggregate stock market index, the variable selection model increases estimation precision and flexibility to conduct sensitivity tests related to estimation window choice. Results are then presented and interpreted.
Event Study Methodology
Stock return event studies test whether an event of interest leads to unusually high or low unexplained stock returns in the immediate period surrounding an event. 60 A strength of an event study is a clearly 60 The seminal event study was Fama, Fisher, Jensen and Roll, who studied the effect of stock splits on stock returns. Binder emphasizes that regulatory event studies (where regulations are the events of interest) are especially difficult to identified counterfactual. Applied to Basel III, BCBS press releases comprise the five events of interest.
The trading day on which an event occurs is the day when any estimated effect is most attributable to investors' reactions to Basel III news.
61 When BCBS press releases occur on non-trading days (e.g.
Event 1 and Event 4), adjustment is expected on the first trading day following the press release. 62 This paper is interested in the effect of news upon firms that would be subject to the agreement's regulations.
Regulated firms are both identifiable and cannot opt into or out of being regulated. Fama, Fisher, Jensen, and Roll 1969; and Binder 1985. 61 The logic is not that BCBS announcements about Basel III are the only events leading to systematic returns. Instead, conditional on a Basel III negotiating announcement, an effect is expected if investors follow negotiation news about the international agreement. Media reports on announcement days reveal no obvious news that might affect all large banks but not the market as a whole, which might confound interpretation of announcement days as reaction to Basel III, with the exception of Event 3 which occurs just before the US Dodd-Frank Act is signed into law.
62 Event 1 is a press release made on US Labor Day (2009 September 7) and Event 4 is a press release on a Sunday (2010 September 12), both nontrading days. The first trading days following these events, and the days I expect to observe Average Announcement Effects on September 8, 2009 and September 13, 2010, respectively. 63 Theoretically, the firms could leave due to bankruptcy or enter if they experience high growth or through mergers. For this sample, however, no firms grow to become large enough to meet the threshold during this period, and firms that go bankrupt are excluded because of the criteria that trading data must be available for all trading days during 2009 and 2010. The sample thus includes firms that have been large for the full period under consideration. Thanks to Christina Davis for emphasizing this point.
64 Formally, this is the Center for Research in Security Prices' (CRSP's) "holding period return", also known as "adjusted return" in Yahoo! Finance. Alternative approaches include the difference in logged prices or nominal percent change, but these do not capture stock splits or dividends which are not necessarily observable in nominal data. 
Date Stock Return Index

Firms
The exact group of banks subject to international regulations is determined by national regulators, 67 Nonfinancial firms will be used to create counterfactual stock returns for each regulated firm of interest. Nonbank financial firms are excluded from analysis, as they are neither regulated firms nor are they a reliable control group because they could gain or lose from Basel III in a more direct way than nonfinancial firms. The formal estimation method is identified below; model specifications and results are then presented.
Formal Quantity of Interest
65 Size threshold is based upon the Federal Reserve's standard to identify the largest banks (called "Peer 1" banks). The sample is the largest set of banks meeting all of the following criteria: (1) bank must be publicly traded on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), the American Stock Exchange (AMEX) or the NASDAQ exchanges, (2) bank must be US-headquartered (i.e. federally incorporated in the United States), (3) (August 18, 2012) . The sample excludes First Bancorp PR (NYSE: FBP), which meets the criteria but which was identified as an outlier firm through tests identified in "Estimation Specification" section below.
66 While some non-bank financial institutions, such as Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley, formally became bank holding companies in the aftermath of the financial crisis, these companies do not meet the criteria for inclusion into the sample.
67 More specifically, each of the 2,884 firms meet all of the following criteria: (1) nonfinancial firms (SIC code < 6000 or SIC code > 6999), (2) Formally, the following estimation is conducted for each of the five events listed in Table 1 . Let i represent each regulated bank (i = 1, 2, ..., 45) and t be a trading day relative to the event (t = −∞, ..., −1, 0, 1, ..., ∞), with the event occurring on day t = 0 . Each regulated bank's stock returns are observed on each trading day and are denoted by R it .
For each regulated bank, the observed stock return on the event day (R i0 ) may be decomposed into Expected Firm Return (R * i0 ) and an error term ( * i0 ) which is the Abnormal Firm Return. Expected Firm Return is the estimated stock return for the regulated firm in the absence of an announcement. Abnormal Firm Return captures how much the observed stock return deviates from Expected Firm Return.
Expected Firm Return
The overall quantity of interest for each event, the Average Announcement Effect (P ), is the average Abnormal Firm Return across all regulated firms on event day. Specific to this analysis, there are 45 regulated firms (N = 45).
Abnormal Firm Return is the relevant estimate for each firm and it is the difference between Observed Firm Return (R i0 ) and estimated Expected Firm Return (R * i0 ), an approach that is illustrated by the grey panel in Figure 2 .
To calculate Expected Firm Return on an event day, observed stock returns of firms that should be unaffected by the event and whose stock returns were highly correlated with the regulated firm's stock returns prior to the event provide a reasonable measure of the expected stock return of the regulated firm in the absence of the event. This paper uses a variable selection method, a Lasso estimator, to identify specific firms that together create a custom market index for each firm for each event. While the Lasso regression differs from the traditional approach that uses an aggregate stock market index, both the Lasso regression and the traditional approach use data prior to the event to identify a relationship between each regulated firm and the a measure of the stock market. They both assume that data observed prior to the (unanticipated) event captures the relationship between an individual stock and the stock market generally. Then, on the event day, the relationship observed prior to the event can be used to predict firm's stock returns over the estimation window as a function of a stock market index, such as the S&P 500 (the weighted-average stock returns of 500 large companies) or an equally-weighted index (the simple average of all publicly traded firm stock returns).
69 The traditional approach applies a simple linear regression to the estimation window data. The dependent variable is the regulated firm's stock return each day during the estimation window, and the explanatory variable is the stock market index return each day. Formally, define M t as the stock market index return on a given trading day. For each regulated firm, for the set of all trading days within the estimation window, a ≤ t ≤ b, the following model is fit: this is a serious concern for this analysis. The next section explains the alternative method used in this paper to overcome these issues and create better goodness of fit.
Variable Selection Model − Custom Firm Index via Lasso Estimator. This paper uses a variable selection model, called a Lasso estimator, to identify a subset of nonfinancial firms whose weightedaverage stock returns over the estimation window are most similar to each regulated firm of interest.
Using patterns in the estimation window data, the Lasso estimator selects a subset of firms that create a custom market index for each regulated firm. This approach better fits estimation window data, creating precise estimations and the ability to test for model sensitivity across estimation windows.
The variable selection method utilizes individual stock returns of unregulated firms over an estimation window. Nonfinancial firms should not be affected by the Basel III regulations and thus the set of all nonfinancial firms comprise the control group. Formally, let j denote a publicly-traded, nonfinancial firm 69 Prominent extensions use multiple measures of stock market performance, yet the general critique remains. Fama and French 1993 have a 3-factor model (with three regressors capturing overall market, firm size, and market-to-book ratio) and Carhart 1997 has a 4-factor model (using the Fama-French regressors plus a measure of stock return momentum). This model also uses a simple regression, but one with a Lasso constraint and with individual firm returns as possible regressors. The dependent variable is the regulated firm's stock return each day during the estimation window, and N j explanatory variables are the stock returns of each unregulated firm. Because there are many more possible regressors (N j = 2, 884) than observations during the event window, the Lasso estimator imposes a constraint such that most weights are constrained to zero and only regressors that best approximate estimation window data have non-zero weights. Formally, the estimation window data is fit by the following model:
71 Thus, the series of β ij over the set of j control firms is the weight given to each nonfinancial, control firm j to fit regulated bank i's stock returns over the estimation window. Most
72 Thus, only a few nonfinancial firms emerge as regressors for each regulated firm and they are specifically selected based upon regulated bank's stock returns over the estimation windows.
When estimation windows change, selected regressors change accordingly. The Lasso estimation method has significantly higher goodness of fit and better predictive power than the traditional stock market index approach, indicating that Lasso provides a more precise model than the traditional approach. Figure 3 plots density of goodness of fit (i.e. adjusted R 2 ) under each estimation strategy for a 20-day estimation window. 73 The interquartile range of the full set of adjusted R 2 values using the Lasso estimator is between 0.58 (first quartile adjusted R 2 ) and 0.95 (third quartile adjusted R 2 ). This range is smaller, and has a higher fit, than the full set of adjusted R 2 using the traditional approach (which is between 0.29 (first quartile) and 0.67 (third quartile)). The Lasso regression fits 71 See Tibshirani 1996; and Hastie, Tibshirani, and Friedman 2009, 68-72 . Selecting λ is an important modeling choice in these models, and in all specifications I use 5-fold cross-validation to produce a series of 100 lambda and select the largest lambda within one standard deviation of the minimum.
72 Of 2,884 nonfinancial firms that are potential regressors, the Lasso constraint identified, on average, 17.5 regressors (with a standard deviation (sd) of 3.51) for 20-day estimation windows, 26.1 regressors (sd of 6.64) for 30-day estimation windows, and 147.7 regressors (sd of 25.18) for 180-day estimation windows.
73 Adjusted R 2 controls for the number of regressors. Separating the plots into individual events, or creating a parallel plot using 180-day estimation window, does not meaningfully change the shape or distribution of each curve. Traditional Approach (Stock Market Index) Lasso Regression (Custom Market Index) Figure 3: Comparing Goodness of Fit (Adjusted R 2 ) Distribution Across Estimation Methods: Adjusted goodness of fit estimates for each firm's model of stock returns over a 20-day estimation window is calculated for each event using the traditional approach and Lasso regression methods, resulting in 225 adjusted R 2 estimations for each method (= 45 banks × 5 events). The above graph plots density curves of the traditional (dotted line) and Lasso (solid line) goodness of fit estimates pooled across events and firms. Higher goodness of fit for Lasso over traditional model using the same observed stock price data indicates that Lasso provides a better model of regulated firm stock returns over the estimation window.
observed data during the estimation window better than does the traditional approach. Further, to ensure that better goodness of fit of sample data translates into better predictive values outside of the estimation window, I calculate the root mean square error (RMSE) for random samples of nonfinancial firms using both the Lasso method and traditional approach. RMSE measures variation in observed values compared to predicted values, with lower RMSE indicating a regression line with better predictive value. Lasso regression has lower RMSE than the traditional event in each calculation, and RMSE using the traditional approach is, on average, 43 times larger than RMSE using the Lasso regression.
74 High goodness of fit and better predictive power using the Lasso estimator lowers estimation noise and leads 74 Specifically, for each event, I calculated RMSE using Lasso regression and the traditional approach for five random samples of 200 randomly selected nonfinancial firms without replacement. In each of the 25 samples (5 samples for each of the 5 events) the Lasso regression always had a significantly lower RMSE. For summary purposes, pooling the 25 samples, average RMSE for Lasso was 0.039 (with a range between a minimum of 0.002 to a maximum of 0.261) versus 0.392 for traditional approach (with a range between 0.168 and 0.600). Among the average RMSE values, Lasso is 10 times lower than the traditional approach, while taking the relative RMSE values for each observation results in the average 43 times referenced in the text.
to clearly interpretable results.
To estimate uncertainty around Average Announcement Effect, I compute 95 percent confidence intervals by following a modified bootstrap method specific to the Lasso estimator.
75 Additional estimation details are provided in the next section before presenting statistical results.
Estimation Specifications
Average Announcement Effect is calculated using four estimation window specifications. Specification show their modified bootstrap process yields a consistent confidence interval for Lasso estimators. The specific process first entails calculating the set of residuals from the set of regulated firms' expected stock returns on an event day. The set of residuals are sampled, with replacement, and added to the fitted values of the original data to create a new sample of (bootstrapped) observed stock returns. For each of 100 bootstrapped samples per event, I use bootstrapped observed returns to reestimate Abnormal Firm Return and calculate Average Announcement Effect. Assuming a normal distribution, I obtain 95 percent confidence intervals using point estimates from the bootstrapped sample data and standard deviation calculated from the bootstrapped samples.
76 That is, the estimation window includes the set of trading days t = {−20, ..., −1}. Return is the difference between observed firm return and expected firm return (calculated using a Lasso estimator as described in the text). Estimates are directly interpretable as the average percent that each regulated firm's stock return were above or below what would have been expected controlling for each day's specific market conditions. divergence was Event 1, where observed stock returns for Event 1 were lower than expected stock returns by 1.43% on average (that is, the Average Announcement Effect was −1.43%). This is the equivalent of $783 million foregone equity for Citigroup shareholders and $2.1 billion foregone equity for Bank of America shareholders. 82 Event 2 (consultative paper release) and Event 5 (final rules release) also resulted in negative and statistically significant stock returns, but with smaller magnitudes (Average Announcement Effects of −0.41% and −0.51%, respectively). Event 3 and Event 4 are associated with firm stock returns that are greater than expected by 0.78% and 0.79%, respectively. Together, the results imply that stock returns do deviate on days of press releases, and while the direction of deviations vary, the net effect is negative and statistically significant, averaging −0.77%.
The right panel presents all four estimation window specifications and establishes consistent results (same sign and statistical significance) across specifications. Within each event, estimates using different estimation windows have similar directions and magnitudes.
83
It is worth noting that Event 4, "Calibration," emerges as the most anticipated press release. That is, the 20-day estimation window (Specification 1) and its 95 percent confidence interval do not overlap with the 20-day estimation window with a 10-day anticipation control (Specification 4). Compared to stock returns immediately prior to the press release, regulated bank stocks were higher than expected by an average of 0.79%. Compared to stock returns up until two weeks before the press release, regulated bank stocks were higher than expected by more than double, an average of 1.64%. This may indicate that anticipation effects in the days leading up to the press release led to underestimated positive stock returns on the day of press release. lower levels than expected. This is consistent with banks incurring greater regulatory costs, and less consistent with any expectation that US regulators negotiate for the private net benefit of US banks. As regulatory negotiations progressed, later events (mid-2010 announcements) were associated with higher stock returns than expected, though this is relative to the cumulative, high-regulatory stringency expected based on earlier events. Media coverage surrounding 2010 events indicate that any relative benefit is attributable to a relatively less stringent regulation than initially expected as the BCBS confirmed long implementation timelines and broadened some capital definition details.
The findings presented here demonstrate the promise of event studies and other micro-level data to analyze informal international obligations, or other policy events that have ambiguous distributional effects. Using indirect outcome measures such as stock returns, which are costly, allow researchers to isolate very specific events, and to parse out international agreement effects distinct from domestic implementation. It circumvents endogeneity inherent in the traditional study of institutional effects which typically measure government actions in response to formal international commitments.
Substantively, findings support the view of financial regulatory networks as credible global governance bodies, consistent with Slaughter and other theorists who argue that third-party enforcement is not necessary for international regime effectiveness. For an important international agreement negotiation, regulators set the regulatory agenda motivated by providing global public goods rather than the international regime locking in net benefits for US firms, consistent with Kapstein. It is also an important case study that shows that regulatory capture does not seem to fully dilute outcomes as Basel III was negotiated. 
